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1  Introduction
The Constitution provides for a framework for the division of functions 
and powers between the three spheres of government. This framework deals 
with the so-called “original” powers and functions of the three spheres, as 
allocated in the Constitution but also with the transfer of additional powers 
and functions to provinces and municipalities. As in all other decentralised 
states, this division is continuously debated and always a site for contestation. 
Section 156(4) of the Constitution occupies an important role in the discussion 
about the division of functions and powers between local government and 
other spheres of government. It provides:
“The national government and provincial governments must assign to a municipality, by agreement, 
and subject to any conditions, the administration of a matter listed in Part A of Schedule 4 or Part A of 
Schedule 5 which necessarily relates to local government, if –
that matter would most effectively be administered locally; and(a) 
the municipality has the capacity to administer it.”(b) 
It is the compulsory wording of the provision that sets it apart from the 
general provisions on transferring additional powers and functions to local 
government.1
It may cause anxiety on the part of national and provincial governments 
who may not wish to be compelled to devolve functions to municipalities. 
On the part of local government, it may also cause anxiety because of a fear 
for unfunded mandates. However, it may also be a reason for enthusiasm, 
particularly on the part of the well-resourced, ambitious municipality that 
identifies opportunities for accelerated devolution.
It is often said that the underlying rationale for this provision is the principle 
of subsidiarity. This article explores the connection between section 156(4) of 
the Constitution and the principle of subsidiarity as it is found in legal theory 
and practice. It explores the historic background of the principle as well as its 
articulation in various domestic and international instruments.
It will be argued that, despite the fact that the connection is tenuous, it may 
assist in the interpretation of this provision. Equipped with this appreciation 
of the connection between subsidiarity and section 156(4) of the Constitution, 
the article provides some suggestions for its application.
* The research for this article was made possible by the Ford Foundation  
1 For a discussion of transferring additional powers and functions to local government see Steytler & De 
Visser Local Government Law of South Africa (2007) 39-49
       
2  Different modes of subsidiarity
Before proceeding to the analysis of section 156(4) of the Constitution, it is 
necessary to reiterate the distinction between various modes of subsidiarity, 
discussed by Du Plessis in an earlier contribution to this journal. Du Plessis 
distinguishes between strategic subsidiarity and institutional subsidiarity.
He posits strategic subsidiarity as a “reading strategy” for legal 
interpretation; if two or more legal norms are applicable to a given situation, 
an external directive may instruct one of those legal norms to “step down”.2 
The permission to use force to make an arrest only in instances where no lesser 
means are available is an example of the application of strategic subsidiarity.3 
Another example is an interpretation that holds that, where it is possible to 
solve a case without reaching a constitutional issue, the case must be solved in 
that way (without recourse to constitutional argument).4
Du Plessis defines institutional subsidiarity as the identification and 
empowerment of an appropriate institutional actor to perform a certain 
function. He remarks that the principle “constrains any more encompassing 
or superordinate institution (or body or community) to refrain from taking 
for its account matters which a more particular, subordinate institution (or 
body or community) can appropriately dispose of, irrespective of whether the 
latter is an organ of state or civil society”.5 Jurisdictional subsidiarity is an 
expression of the broader institutional subsidiarity principle. For example, 
the notion that the Constitution Court leaves the development of common 
law to the Supreme Court of Appeal can be regarded as an application of the 
principle of jurisdictional subsidiarity.6 Generally, it is said that the South 
African court structure, much like the German court structure, is based on 
the subsidiarity principle:7 matters are referred to a higher court only if the 
court a quo is prevented from hearing the matter.8
This article examines the relationship between section 156(4) of the 
Constitution and subsidiarity. It is thus concerned with institutional 
subsidiarity as it relates to public institutions. However, the other varieties 
of the subsidiarity principle, even though they are not directly relevant to 
understanding section 156(4) of the Constitution, both represent a trend that 
underlies all manifestations of the subsidiarity principle. This trend may be 
curtly described as an automatic bias towards the small that only gives way 
to a reasoned argument for the big. It will be argued below that there are 
important nuances to be made in the manner in which section 156(4) expresses 
this notion.
2 Du Plessis “Subsidiarity: What’s in the name for Constitutional Interpretation and Adjudication?” 2006 
Stell LR 209
3 209
4 217
5 209
6 212  
7 Carpenter “Cooperative Government, Devolution of Powers and Subsidiarity: The South African 
Perspective” in Seminar Report: Subnational Constitutional Governance (1999) 45 46
8 Van Wyk “Subsidariteit as Waarde wat die Oop en Demokratiese Suid-Afrikaanse Gemeenskap ten 
Grondslag Lê” in Carpenter (ed) Suprema Lex: Opstelle oor die Grondwet aangebied aan Marinus 
Wiechers (1998) 251 255
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3  Arguments for institutional subsidiarity
The argument for institutional subsidiarity can and has been peddled from 
various angles, denominations and beliefs. What follows is a quick survey 
of some of the most important historic and philosophical foundations for the 
principle of institutional subsidiarity.
3 1  Liberty and Catholic social philosophy
The subsidiarity argument has been advanced on the basis of the fundamental 
value of liberty and the sovereignty of the individual. The liberty rationale 
for subsidiarity holds that communities, religious associations and cultural 
associations are important for supporting the needs of the individual.9 
This justifies institutional subsidiarity as a principle for non-interference in 
families and voluntary associations, such as guilds and unions, but also in 
cities, provinces and states.
Institutional subsidiarity also has a religious heritage, namely in Catholic 
social philosophy. In fact, the subsidiarity principle was first articulated in the 
context of this religious social philosophy.10 In as early as 1891, Pope Leo 
XIII placed great emphasis on the importance of the individual and the family. 
Voluntary associations were deemed of equal importance to the individual and 
the family as they are necessary for the development of individual dignity and 
for assisting those who lack ways or means of developing.11 State intervention 
into matters of the individual, the family and voluntary associations that is 
not absolutely necessary to protect the common good or prevent injury is 
thus rejected. Pope Pius XI is widely credited for the first articulation of the 
Catholic principle of (institutional) subsidiarity due to the following, rather 
imposing, statement:
“It is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater 
and higher association what lesser and subordinate organisations can do.”12
The Catholic rationale was that power should be left to individuals, voluntary 
associations and families because they are more likely to exercise that power 
in a wise and socially useful manner.13
Section 156(4) of the Constitution obviously differs from the above two 
expressions of subsidiarity in that it refers to the relationship between spheres 
of government, more specifically, between, on the one hand, national and 
provincial governments and local governments on the other. The principle 
of subsidiarity as defined in the liberty and Catholic argument is not limited 
in scope to public bodies but includes civil society14 and in fact also extends 
fundamentally to the relationship between the state and the individual.15
9 Føllesdal “Survey Article: Subsidiarity” 1998 The Journal of Political Philosophy 190 200-207
10 Besselink, Albers & Eijsbouts “Subsidiarity in non-federal Contexts” 1994 SEW 275 279-28; Van Wyk 
“Subsidariteit” in Suprema Lex 254; Du Plessis 2006 Stell LR 208
11 Føllesdal 1998 The Journal of Political Philosophy 207-208
12 Pope Pius XI Quadragisimo Anno (1931)
13 Barber “The Limited Modesty of Subsidiarity” 2005 European Law Journal 308 314
14 Van Wyk “Subsidariteit” in Suprema Lex 255; Barber 2005 European Law Journal 311
15 Van Wyk “Subsidariteit” in Suprema Lex 258
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As alluded to above, the focus of this article is on a more limited form of 
institutional subsidiarity, namely its application to public institutions.
3 2  Fiscal federalism
Contemporary arguments for institutional subsidiarity can be launched 
from the platform of fiscal federalism: public goods should be produced by 
the government that has jurisdiction over the area where that good is “public”. 
The objective in this argument is different and perhaps somewhat less noble 
than in the two arguments above; the goal is to achieve the greatest possible 
efficiency in decision making.16
3 3  Democracy
The democratic equivalent of the fiscal federalism argument holds that the 
people who participate in the deliberative process on the delivery of a public 
good should be those people that have a significant interest in the delivery 
of that public good. If too many people with an insignificant interest are 
included, the deliberative process becomes over-inclusive and democratic 
control is diluted as a result.
The above four rationales based on liberty, Catholic social philosophy, 
fiscal federalism and democracy appear to be the most commonly used 
arguments to explain the roots and operation of the subsidiarity principle. It is 
argued in this article that not all rationales apply with equal force to the South 
African Constitution and to section 156(4) in particular. The fiscal federalism 
or “efficiency” rationale appears to top the list in this regard. It is suggested 
that this has consequences for the interpretation of section 156(4) of the 
Constitution. However, before this argument can be outlined, it is necessary to 
further narrow down and define the principle of subsidiarity as it is expressed 
in section 156(4) of the Constitution.
4  Field of application
What does a principle of subsidiarity do in the relationship between levels 
or spheres of government? How does a “bias for the small” manifest itself? It is 
suggested that three areas of intergovernmental relations where the principle 
has an effect are to be distinguished, namely the protection of competencies, 
co-operative decision making and the allocation of competencies.
Protective subsidiarity holds that central government should not unduly 
interfere in subnational matters. Participatory subsidiarity provides a rationale 
for subnational participation in central decision making. Should subnational 
governments have “a veto, votes or voice” in national government decision 
making? Finally, allocative subsidiarity relates to the bias for subnational 
entities when it comes to the allocation of powers and functions.
With the isolation of the allocative principle of subsidiarity we have 
arrived at the essence of section 156(4) of the Constitution. The allocative 
16 Føllesdal 1998 The Journal of Political Philosophy 205
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principle of subsidiarity manifests itself as a logic for regulating the location 
of competencies at a central or decentralised level. It may thus play a role 
during the formulation or amendment of a Constitution in that it calls for a bias 
towards decentralised exercise of powers and functions.17 It may also play a 
role in the interpretation of competencies once they have been formulated in a 
Constitution. It would then insert the same principle, namely a preference for 
the decentralised unit. Lastly, it may play a role in discussions surrounding the 
transfer of functions from central government to subnational governments. 
Section 156(4) of the Constitution deals specifically with the last as it posits a 
mechanism for a “compulsory” transfer of functions to a municipality.
5  Effects of the principle of institutional subsidiarity
The general principle of institutional subsidiarity can, if applied successfully, 
have one of a number of effects. Firstly, it can have a proscriptive effect in 
that it proscribes certain “senior” government action or the extension of 
government action into a particular functional area. Secondly, it can have a 
prescriptive effect in that it may require national government action; if the 
application of the principle dictates that a particular area is not suitable for local 
government activity it therefore requires of a “senior” government to occupy 
that space. Similarly, the application of the principle may require national 
government to take action that empowers lower levels of government. It has 
also been argued that institutional subsidiarity can have a “creative” effect 
in that the application of the principle may demand the establishment of new 
structures.18 If there is a mismatch between the exercise of public power and 
the constituency affected by the power and this mismatch cannot be resolved 
by relocating the power to another existing structure, a new structure may 
need to be established.
6  Objective
Føllesdal describes the overall objective of institutional subsidiarity 
as reducing the risk of a “permanent minority status” for lower levels of 
government.19 In the context of this article and its reflection on section 156(4) 
of the Constitution, this refers to the risk of a permanent “minority status” of 
local government. The allocative variety of institutional subsidiarity seeks to 
help generate a systematic deliberation about the division of functions with a 
distinct logic based on a bias towards subnational government.
Its track record, however, on achieving this particular objective is not 
impressive. Føllesdal remarks that “rather than reducing and removing 
fundamental political conflicts, the principle of subsidiarity increases and 
shapes such tensions”.20 When it comes to subsidiarity, representatives of 
all political and intergovernmental persuasions usually agree enthusiastically 
17 Carpenter Carpenter “Cooperative Government” in Subnational Constitutional Governance 46; Van 
Wyk “Subsidariteit” in Suprema Lex 256
18 Barber 2005 European Law Journal 319
19 Føllesdal 1998 The Journal of Political Philosophy 190-191
20 Føllesdal 1998 The Journal of Political Philosophy 190
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with the principle. However, they are likely to disagree bitterly over how it 
ought to be implemented. For example, the principle may be employed by 
subnational units as a lever to engage in intergovernmental politicking; claims 
for authority based on subsidiarity actually mask a quest for political point-
scoring. Conversely, the principle may be used by senior governments to shed 
responsibility; the subsidiarity rhetoric is then used to conceal a drive towards 
loading functions onto local government. In sum, the ability of the subsidiarity 
principle to “objectify” a discussion on functions and powers should not be 
overstated.
7  Manifestations of the principle in domestic and international 
instruments
In this part of the article, the most important manifestations of the allocative 
principle of institutional subsidiary are discussed. It is safe to say that the 
contemporary subsidiarity principle owes its popularity to both Germany 
and the European Union, which is why these two jurisdictions are discussed. 
Subsequently, expressions of the principle in formal and informal international 
instruments are examined.
7 1  Europe
The principle gained political currency in the European Union since 
the late 1980s when it was introduced in response to fears of European 
centralisation.21 The German Länder, in particular, were afraid of the effects 
that Europeanisation would have on their federal system.22 The principle thus 
entered the European polity on the back of the federal idea as espoused in 
Germany.23 The 1992 Maastricht Treaty on the European Union and the 1997 
Treaty of Amsterdam codified the principle into the Treaty of the European 
Community:
“In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can, therefore, by reason of the scale 
or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.
 Any action by the Community shall not go beyond that what is necessary to achieve the objectives 
of this Treaty.”24
It emphasises the recognition of the sovereignty of the Member States that 
comprise the Union.25 It does this in much the same way as the liberal and 
Catholic rationales for subsidiarity emphasise the sovereignty of the individual, 
the community, the association, the city and the province that comprise the 
21 Lenaerts, Van nuffel & Bray Constitutional Law of the European Union (2005) 101
22 Van Wyk “Subsidariteit” in Suprema Lex 253; Føllesdal 1998 The Journal of Political Philosophy 190-
191
23 On the principle of subsidiarity in the German Constitution, see for example Rau “Subsidiarity and 
Judicial Review in German Federalism” 2003 German Law Journal 223 227; Taylor “Germany: A Slow 
Death of Subsidiarity?” 2009 Int’l J Const L 139 139-154
24 Art 5 of the Treaty of the European Community
25 See further Lenaerts et al Constitutional Law 100-112 on the principle of subsidiarity in the European 
Union
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state. A more general expression of the principle is found in article 1 of the 
Treaty of the European Union which states that decisions will be taken “as 
closely as possible to the citizen”.
Barber identifies three operative elements in article 5 of the Treaty of the 
European Community. Firstly, there is a preference for power to be allocated 
to the smaller unit. Second, this allocation is qualified by an efficiency 
test: power should be shifted downwards unless centralisation will result 
in efficiency gains. Third, the efficiency test is, in turn, qualified by the 
instruction that the gains must be sufficient, ie of a certain minimum level to 
warrant centralisation.26
The symbolic and political importance of the subsidiarity principle in the 
European polity is undisputed; it is regarded as a principle that reveals the 
roots and identity of the European project.27 However, it has proved to be 
difficult to enforce legally. It has certainly not been vigorously enforced by the 
courts.28 The most elaborate judicial discussion of the principle spans nine 
paragraphs in R v Secretary of State for Health, ex. Parte Imperial Tobacco.29 
Barber concludes that –
“[a]s a legal principle, a justiciable constraint on the power of the Community Institutions, subsidiarity 
has had little obvious effect. Perhaps daunted by the complicated political assessments the principle 
entails, or less charitably, perhaps disinclined to develop a principle that limits the centralisation of 
power, the European Court has not made use of the principle.”30
7 2  Germany
As Van Wyk points out, a number of features in the German Basic Law can 
be highlighted as manifestations of the subsidiarity principle.31 Firstly, article 
70(1), which provides that the Länder have the power to legislate insofar as the 
Basic Law does not confer legislative powers on the Federation is an expression 
of the allocative principle of subsidiarity. The same applies to the provision 
that, where the Länder and the Federation have concurrent legislative powers, 
the Länder may legislate as long as, and to the extent that, the Federation does 
not use its legislative power.32 A third expression of the allocative principle of 
subsidiarity is the provision that the Federation may only legislate on certain 
concurrent matters when the subsidiarity principle is complied with.33 Article 
72(2) of the German Basic Law provides as follows:
“Auf den Gebieten des Artikels 74 Abs. 1 Nr. 4, 7, 11, 13, 15, 19a, 20, 22, 25 und 26 hat der Bund 
das Gesetzgebungsrecht, wenn und soweit die Herstellung gleichwertiger Lebensverhältnisse im 
26 Barber 2005 European Law Journal 311  See also Lenaerts et al Constitutional Law 103
27 Barber 2005 European Law Journal 308
28 Taylor “Germany: The Subsidiarity Principle” 2006 Int’l J Const L 115 116  
29 Case C-491/01, R v Secretary of State for Health, ex. Parte Imperial Tobacco [2002] ECR I-11453, 177-
185
30 Barber 2005 European Law Journal 324 (footnotes omitted)
31 Van Wyk “Subsidariteit” in Suprema Lex 256-259
32 Article 72(1) of the German Basic Law
33 Von Münch Staatsrecht Band 1 (2000) 214
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Bundesgebiet oder die Wahrung der Rechts- oder Wirtschaftseinheit im gesamtstaatlichen Interesse 
eine bundesgesetzliche Regelung erforderlich macht.”34
Therefore, the issue as to whether the Federation may legislate on these 
concurrent subject matters is determined by more than just the answer to the 
subject-matter question. In addition, the above test must be satisfied. This sets 
the German Federation apart from other federations that use a subject-matter 
catalogue as issues such as these can then usually be decided on the first 
question only. It renders the provision a clear expression of the subsidiarity 
principle.35
The power of the Federation to pass framework legislation on certain Länder 
competencies, which has been abolished as a result of the federal reform of 
2006, was also a manifestation of the subsidiarity principle. This limit on 
Federal legislative power stems from a “bias for the small”, ie the Länder. 
Finally, the provision that permits the Länder to execute Federal laws “as 
matters of their own concern” insofar as this Basic Law does not otherwise 
provide or permit, can be pointed out as an expression of subsidiarity.
The above features all concern the role of the Länder vis-à-vis the 
Federation and don’t have an immediate impact on the powers of local 
government. However, one provision in the Basic Law deals specifically with 
local government and can be seen as an expression of institutional subsidiarity 
with regard to local government. Article 28(2) provides that:
“[t]he communities must be guaranteed the right to regulate on their own responsibility all the affairs 
of the local community within the limits set by law. The associations of communities also have the 
right of self- government in accordance with the law within the limits of the functions given them 
by law.”
It is suggested that the explicit guarantee for “associations of communities” 
to have the right of self- government harks back to the historic origins of 
subsidiarity discussed above.
When it comes to judicial enforcement of the subsidiarity principle, 
Germany has travelled further than the European Union. In a number of cases, 
the Constitutional Court has indicated that the abovementioned section 72(2) 
is justiciable. The most prominent example is the 2002 Geriatric Caregivers 
case,36 in which the Court struck down federal legislation insofar as it dealt 
with the occupational registration and training for those who care for the 
aged.37 Initially, the impact of section 72(2) was limited. The conflict with 
section 72(2) was usually added as an afterthought to the conclusion that 
the legislation failed the traditional subject-matter enquiry (ie whether the 
34 Article 72(1) of the German Basic Law reads as follows:
   “In the fields of article 74(1)(iv), (vii), (xiii), (xv), (xixA), (xx), (xii), (xv) and (xvi), the Federation has 
the power to enact legislation if, and to the extent that federal legislation is necessary in order to bring 
about living standards of equivalent standard within the Federation or the maintenance of legal or 
economic unity in the interests of the whole state ” (Author’s translation)
 See also Hopkins Devolution in Context: Regional Federal and Devolved Government in the European 
Union (2002) 86
35 Taylor 2006 Int’l J Const L 115
36 BVerfGE 106, 62 (2002)
37 The federal legislation regarding geriatric care givers was held to be valid but the legislation regarding 
assistant geriatric care givers was invalidated, BVerfGE 106, 62 (166)
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matter falls within the list of concurrent subject-matters).38 However, in more 
recent cases, the Court struck down legislation that had indeed passed the 
traditional subject-matter test on the basis of a violation of the subsidiarity 
principle in section 72(2) of the German Basic Law.39 These judgments caused 
anxiety on the part of the Federation. During the 2006 reforms of Germany’s 
federal structure, the ambit of the subsidiarity principle in section 72(2) was 
significantly reduced by limiting its applicability to a selected number of 
concurrent subject matters.40
7 3  Local Government instruments
The subsidiarity principle has found expression in a number of international 
instruments that seek to promote local government.
7 3 1  United Cities and Local Governments of Africa
The recently established United Cities and Local Governments of Africa 
(UCLGA) has sought to embrace the notion of subsidiarity in its founding 
documents. Generally, the UCLGA adopts the “distinct but subsidiary” 
maxim as a rally for constitutional recognition of local government.41 The 
juxtaposition of distinctiveness and subsidiarity connotes a somewhat twisted 
version of the subsidiarity principle which says that local government is a 
subsidiary of national government. As will be clear from the above discussion 
of the arguments for subsidiarity, this emphasis is an anathema to the notion 
of subsidiarity.
7 3 2  Commonwealth Aberdeen agenda
The Aberdeen Agenda: Commonwealth Principles on Good Practice 
for Local Democracy and Good Governance was formally adopted by 
the Commonwealth Local Government Forum in 2005 and endorsed by 
Commonwealth Heads of State in the same year.42 It represents a set of 
standards to promote healthy local democracy and good governance throughout 
the Commonwealth.
Article 4 of the Aberdeen Agenda reads:
“Defined legislative framework: Local democracy should ensure local government has appropriate 
powers in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity.
38 Taylor 2006 Int’l J Const L 120
39 In the Shop Trading Hours case BVerfGE 111, 10 (2004), the Court held that a federal law on shop trading 
hours, fell outside the ambit of federal legislative power for want of compliance with article 72(2)  In the 
Student Fees and Unions case BVerfGE 112, 226 (2005), the Court condemned a federal prohibition of 
student fees for first degrees under s 72(2) of the Basic Law even though the Federation was legislating 
within a concurrent subject-matter
40 The following opening sentence was added to article 72(2):
“The Federation shall have the right to legislate on matters falling within clauses 4, 7, 11, 13, 15, 19 
a, 20, 22, 25 and 26 of paragraph (1) of Article 74”.
41 “UCLGA Seeks a Direct Relationship with the African Union” 2005 United Voices 3 http://www
uclgafrica org/newsletters/uclga_newsletter_dec_2005 pdf (accessed 23-03- 2010)
42 Commonwealth Local Government Forum Aberdeen Agenda: Commonwealth Principles on Good 
Practice for Local Democracy and Good Governance (2005) www clgf org uk (accessed 10-04-2008)
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 Democratic local government, with clearly defined powers, serves as the means by which the 
community can shape their livelihoods.
 Effective devolution enables the views of the local community to be expressed and their views 
taken into account in decisions implemented to improve the quality of life of all citizens locally.”43
The Agenda explicitly introduces the principle of subsidiarity. It does not 
proffer any definition of the principle, except for introducing “appropriateness” 
as a criterion. In its further provisions it emphasises that powers should be 
clearly defined. Three important notions are put forward that may shape the 
interpretation of the subsidiarity principle as put forward in the Aberdeen 
Agenda. Firstly, the Aberdeen Agenda links subsidiarity to the shaping of 
livelihoods, which relates to the “place-shaping” role of municipalities and 
may offer guidance on which government functions attract the operation of 
the subsidiarity principle. Secondly, it finds a rationale for subsidiarity in the 
opportunities for community participation in decision making. Thirdly, it 
speaks of “effective” devolution, thereby promoting a functional approach to 
devolution.
The Aberdeen Agenda is a statement of commitment by the Commonwealth. 
It has no discernable legal application.
7 3 3  European Charter on local self-government
The clearest articulation of the subsidiarity principle with regard to 
local government can be found in the European Charter on Local Self-
Government.44 This Charter is a treaty open for adoption by Members of the 
Council of Europe. Article 4(3) of the Charter reads:
“Public responsibilities shall generally be exercised, in preference, by those authorities which are 
closest to the citizen. Allocation of responsibility to another authority should weigh up the extent and 
nature of the task and requirements of efficiency and economy.”45
The Charter does not quite contain the “automatic bias” of the classic 
principle of subsidiarity, as it is expressed in European Union law. It rather 
speaks of a “preference” and stipulates that allocation to another authority 
requires motivation. This motivation should balance the extent and nature of 
the task on the one hand and the requirements of efficiency and economy 
on the other. While the rationale for the bias towards local government is 
not immediately apparent from the provision (“extent” and “nature” are 
notoriously vague terms), the rationale for allocation to a higher order must be 
based on “efficiency and economy” arguments.
The provisions of the Charter of Local Self-Government are binding on 
the states that signed and ratified it.46 However, the legal application of the 
Charter is limited. The Courts in the Member States generally do not view 
the provisions as capable of direct application as they are not “self executing”; 
no individual person or organ of state can realistically invoke any of its 
provisions in a court of law. For example, when the netherlands, a signatory 
43 Commonwealth Local Government Forum Aberdeen Agenda
44 European Charter of Local Self-Government, Strasbourg, 15 X 1985
45 European Charter of Local Self-Government
46 The Charter has been ratified by 44 Member States and entered into force on 1 September 1988
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to the Charter, adopted legislation that partly abolished property rates, the 
Dutch Association of Municipalities launched a challenge in the High Court. 
It argued that the law was inconsistent with article 9(3) of the Charter, which 
states that at least part of local government’s revenue should be derived from 
taxes and charges. The High Court held that it could not test the statute against 
this treaty provision as it is formulated in general terms and not intended to 
be binding on everyone.47 The enforcement of compliance with the Charter 
thus takes place within the confines of the Council of Europe; the Council 
itself assesses whether or not Member States comply with the Charter. It 
relies on reports from Member States for its monitoring. The configuration 
for enforcement does not include a supranational court structure such as the 
court structure that enforces the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
8  Subsidiarity, local government and the Constitution
After having discussed the background to the principle of subsidiarity and 
the manner in which it is articulated in various domestic and international 
instruments, the attention now shifts to the South African Constitution and 
section 156(4) in particular.
neither the Constitution nor the Constitutional Court employs the term 
subsidiarity. In this respect, Van Wyk remarks that the principle of subsidiarity 
was propagated during the constitutional negotiations by those who supported 
a federal solution.48 He cites this as one of the reasons why the principle was not 
formally embraced in the Constitution. However, many authors, writing about 
subsidiarity in the South African Constitution, stress that the Constitution 
does not establish a closed system of values and that it therefore can be argued 
that the subsidiarity principle is one of the values in the Constitution. Flowing 
from the above description of the areas of application of the principle, it has 
been argued that the Constitution contains a number of manifestations of 
institutional subsidiarity. Detailed descriptions of the various clauses in the 
Constitution that can be viewed as manifestations of the subsidiarity principle 
have been traversed in other writings.49 In the context of this article, only the 
manifestations of subsidiarity that relate to local government are dealt with 
shortly.
Firstly, the terminology in the Constitution can be viewed as the outcome 
of the application of subsidiarity. Van Wyk argues that the use of the term 
“spheres” instead of “tiers” renders the Constitution in principle one of the most 
“subsidiarity-friendly” Constitutions.50 Section 151(4) of the Constitution is 
clearly connected to the “protective” operation of subsidiarity: national and 
provincial governments “may not compromise or impede a municipality’s 
47 VNG vs Staat LJn: BA3438, High Court of the Hague 4 3
48 Van Wyk “Subsidariteit” in Suprema Lex 260
49 Van Wyk “Subsidariteit” in Suprema Lex 262-266; Carpenter “Cooperative Government” in Subnational 
Constitutional Governance 47-52
50 Van Wyk “Subsidariteit” in Suprema Lex 263, 265
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ability or right to exercise its powers or perform its functions”.51 The notions of 
local government representation in Parliament52 and the duty of national and 
provincial governments to seek local government’s input in the preparation of 
legislation affecting local government can both be considered as the offspring 
of “participatory” subsidiarity.53
As stated earlier, section 156(4) of the Constitution can be viewed as 
an expression of the “allocative” principle of institutional subsidiarity. It 
has been argued that section 156(4) is “the embodiment of the principle of 
subsidiary”.54 It is suggested that this argument requires two nuances. Firstly, 
the argument that section 156(4) embodies the subsidiarity principle does 
not do justice to the protective and participatory elements of subsidiarity 
that appear elsewhere in the Constitution. Secondly, as will be argued in this 
article, this provision does not embrace the classic concept of institutional 
subsidiarity but rather gives its own expression to it. This expression, it will 
be contended, is more calculated and functional than the grand, principled 
approach to subsidiarity in its original, historic form and its manifestation in 
Germany and the European Union.
9  Rationale for subsidiarity in the South African Constitution
In order to understand notions of subsidiarity in the Constitution, it is useful 
to examine whether any of the rationales of institutional subsidiarity that 
were discussed earlier in this article are relevant to guiding the interpretation 
of section 156(4) of the Constitution. It is suggested that both the Catholic 
rationale and the efficiency rationale deserve to be highlighted in the South 
African context.
9 1  Catholic rationale
Comparing a modern Constitution and something as archaic as a nineteenth 
century Catholic argument for subsidiarity can easily be dismissed as far-
fetched. However, there are some compelling linkages between, on the one 
hand, historic and current concepts of local government in South Africa and, 
on the other, the values pursued by the Catholic subsidiarity principle. Firstly, 
the architecture of local government before 1994 was based on the notion that 
the municipality as a body is made up by inhabitants of the municipality. For 
example, in the opening line of their work on municipal law, Dönges and Van 
Winsen described a municipality thus:
“A municipal corporation is a form of universitas, ie an aggregate of natural persons forming as 
a group a new subject of rights and duties, separate and distinct from the rights and duties of the 
individual persons who constitute the group. It is thus a legal abstraction or fiction by which the law 
51 266
52 S 67
53 S 154(2); Van Wyk “Subsidariteit” in Suprema Lex
54 Budhu & Wiechers “Current Judicial Trends Pertaining to Devolution and Assignment of Powers to Local 
Government” 2003 SAPL 468 473
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has created a new entity out of a group of natural persons and has endowed it with a distinct juristic 
personality, capable of functioning in various respects as a natural person.”55
The ordinances established the principle that a municipality consisted of 
the inhabitants, or more restrictively, the ratepayers, of the municipality. For 
example, the Cape Municipal Ordinance of 1912 declared that the inhabitants 
of the municipality were the “corporators” of the body corporate – the 
municipality. Given this basis, Watermeyer J had the following to say about 
the nature of the municipal council:
“The council therefore by a Statute is made the agent of the body corporate, but the council itself is not 
a body corporate; it consists of a number of members whose acts are determined by the majority, and 
when they act collectively by resolution properly taken then they act as agents for the body corporate, 
the municipality.”56
The dismantling of the old local government architecture and the emergence 
of a new local government dispensation created a notion that is not altogether 
dissimilar, despite the fact that it was based on a radically different rationale. 
Section 2(b) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act57 (“Municipal 
Systems Act”) provides that the municipality consists of the political 
structures, administration and the community of the municipality. Historic as 
well as current perspectives on the notion of a municipality in South Africa 
thus portray the municipality not just as a public body or as a subsidiary of the 
national government but as an association of individuals, communities and 
public structures. Both historic and current perspectives of local government 
in South Africa thus establish the relevance of the Catholic subsidiarity 
principle which cherished the small-scale association as an essential conduit 
for the attainment of personal dignity.
9 2  Efficiency or functionality rationale
The expression of subsidiarity in section 156(4) of the Constitution appears 
to be mostly based on efficiency rather than generic, sweeping values or 
principles such as liberty or individual autonomy. Van Wyk remarks that the 
emphasis in the South African version of subsidiarity is on effectiveness.58 
Effectiveness and efficiency are not the same concepts: effectiveness connotes 
impact while efficiency connotes good organisation. Both can be captured 
under the term functionality and it is argued that the expression of subsidiarity 
in the South African Constitution is strongly influenced by a concern for 
functionality. The inclusion of capacity as a condition for the operation of 
section 156(4) is the clearest indication that a functionality rationale is 
envisaged: subsidiarity in its purest, principled form based on liberty takes 
no note of factors as “mundane” as capacity. However, a subsidiarity principle 
based on functionality does take note of such factors. Also, the fact that section 
156(4) recognises and encourages asymmetry, a government à la carte, is an 
55 Dönges & Van Winsen Municipal Law with Special Reference to the Cape Province (1953) 1
56 De Villiers and Others v Beaufort West Municipality 1924 CPD 501 504  See further Steytler & De Visser 
Local Government Law 1-5
57 Act 32 of 2000
58 Van Wyk “Subsidariteit” in Suprema Lex 267
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indication of a functional basis for this expression of subsidiarity rather than 
an overtly principled basis.59
One of the consequences of relying on the functionality rationale is that it 
renders the subsidiarity principle more amenable to arguments that larger units 
are sometimes more likely to make the right decision than smaller ones for 
external reasons. These external reasons do not necessarily have to be derived 
from dogmas surrounding liberty or autonomy. For example, access to an 
expert civil service may give a larger unit an advantage over a lower unit.60 A 
dogged application of subsidiarity along autonomy or liberty rationales would 
be less amenable to the incorporation of such arguments.
9 3  Establishing an endogenous rationale: developmental local 
government
Both the Catholic rationale of protecting the community association and 
the functionality rationale of configuring an effective state are thus relevant 
for the interpretation of section 156(4) of the Constitution. It is argued that 
the Constitution itself, however, offers the strongest rationale. This rationale 
consolidates the Catholic and functionality rationale into one that is based on 
the concept of the developmental local state.
If the functionality rationale is taken as a starting point, it becomes clear 
that functionality in and of itself is a hollow shell. Measuring effectiveness 
and efficiency can only be done if it is known what goals must be achieved.61 
The objects of local government, as set out in section 152(1) of the Constitution 
are particularly instructive in that regard. They set out the overall goals to be 
achieved by local government, namely to:
provide democratic and accountable government for local communities;• 
ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner;• 
provide social and economic development;• 
promote a safe and healthy environment; and• 
encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations • 
in the matters of local government.
It is thus suggested that subsidiarity in local government and section 156(4) 
of the Constitution in particular, must be understood in light of the objects of 
local government as set out in section 152 of the Constitution. The Constitution 
envisages municipalities to strive towards the abovementioned developmental 
goals, which take the municipal function beyond being an instrument for 
service delivery at the behest of national and provincial governments. This 
constitutional vision needs to match with a distribution of powers that ensures 
that municipalities are enabled to achieve these objects. The Constitution 
itself recognises that the distribution set forth by it may not be adequate in 
all circumstances. This is why it makes specific provision for the transfer of 
59 Føllesdal 1998 The Journal of Political Philosophy 206
60 Barber 2005 European Law Journal 320
61 Barber 2005 European Law Journal 308 318
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powers and functions to local government or to individual municipalities. 
The Constitution supplements its framework for assignment with a guiding 
provision in section 156(4). The subsidiarity principle of section 156(4) thus 
exists to insert a logic that promotes a distribution of powers between spheres 
of government that enables the State to achieve the developmental objects of 
local government effectively and efficiently.
10  Observations on section 156(4) of the Constitution
The above examination of the background to the allocative principle of 
institutional subsidiarity as expressed in section 156(4) of the Constitution 
and the construction of an endogenous rationale for it should guide the 
interpretation of and approach to this provision. A few proposals are made 
below.
10 1  Limited functional scope
The Constitution makes it clear that the blessings of small government 
apply to certain functional areas, not all. The functional scope of institutional, 
allocative subsidiarity is limited. The Constitution limits the scope of its 
application to Schedule 4A and 5A matters, to the exclusion of the residual 
national matters. The normative value of the subsidiarity principle is thus 
limited. This limitation, it is suggested, further supports the contention that 
the normative value of the institutional allocative subsidiarity principle is less 
pronounced: to the extent that the principle is expressed in section 156(4), this 
is born out of concern for efficiency rather than liberty or individual autonomy. 
Institutional, allocative subsidiarity appears to be a calculated premise rather 
than an overtly principled one.
10 2  A-political subsidiarity?
It appears from the brief description of the experience with subsidiarity that 
its ability to neutralise the politics around division of powers and functions 
should not be overestimated. It may thus be appropriate to caution against 
viewing section 156(4) as the Constitution’s best kept secret on how to 
approach devolution of powers and functions: it does not contain a recipe for 
the alchemy of optimal division of functions.
10 3  Preference rather than automatic bias
Section 156(4) of the Constitution does not fit in well with the basic notion 
of “a bias for the small that gives way only to a reasoned argument for the 
big”. The provision rather works the other way around. The classic notion of 
subsidiarity contains a burden of argument for centralisation on the central 
government. In its purest form, subsidiarity goes even further and holds that 
the power originally rests with the subnational unit and is delegated upwards 
at the discretion of the latter, and not at the discretion of the central authority. 
Conversely, the expression of subsidiarity in section 156(4) contains a burden 
of argument for decentralisation. Van Wyk points towards this difficulty 
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when he refers to the debates on the 1993 Constitution, in which arguments 
based on allocative subsidiarity were proffered to determine the relationship 
between national and provincial governments. The problem, he argues, is that 
these arguments are based on a top-down approach or a shifting of powers, 
implying that all powers vest in the centre.62 Despite this, both the 1993 and 
the 1996 Constitution clearly proceed from that assumption.
The difference in approach between section 156(4) and classic notions of 
subsidiarity is evident from the application of the efficiency test. Both the 
European and the South African variety of allocative subsidiarity contain 
an efficiency test. However, the similarity is more apparent than real. The 
European test relates to efficiency gains that may be had by centralisation while 
the South African test relates to gains that may be had by decentralisation. In 
terms of article 5 of the Treaty of the European Community, powers go up 
only if and so far as they can be more efficiently exercised at a decentralised 
level. Section 156(4) of the Constitution provides that powers go down if the 
objectives can be better achieved at the decentralised level. An important driver 
for the approach in the Treaty of the European Community is the notion that 
the smaller unit should reap the benefit of error: if a function is misallocated, 
let it be misallocated to the smaller unit rather than to the larger body.63 This 
premise derives from the notion that state sovereignty resides in the people as 
a corporate body constituted by cities and provinces. It is difficult to locate a 
similar argument within the South African Constitution.
These observations do not detract from the fact that the overall objective 
remains the same, namely to recognise a preference for local government when 
it comes to the allocation of powers. In sum, it may be appropriate to view the 
subsidiarity principle for local government as a “preference for the small”, 
rather than an “automatic bias towards the small”. This is also in line with 
the manner in which relevant international instruments such as the European 
Charter and the Aberdeen Agenda formulate the principle in its application to 
local government.
10 4  Residual powers
The location of residual powers can be seen as a function of whether or not 
the principle of subsidiarity has been embraced.64 For example, the location 
of residual powers with the Länder in Germany (see above) is an expression 
of subsidiarity. Van Wyk argues that the location of residual powers with 
the national government does not mean that only Parliament may exercise 
those powers: nothing prohibits Parliament from assigning anyone of those 
residual powers to other spheres of government. However, whether or not a 
residual power is assigned to another sphere of government is really a “top-
down matter”, decided within the discretion of the national government. 
Importantly, decision making in this regard is not subject to section 156(4) 
62 Van Wyk “Subsidariteit” in Suprema Lex 259
63 Barber 2005 European Law Journal 313
64 Van Wyk “Subsidariteit” in Suprema Lex 256
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of the Constitution. It is therefore, argued that the fact that the Constitution 
allocates residual powers to Parliament points towards a modest embracement 
of the subsidiarity principle.
10 5  Whose principle is it to apply?
The question as to who applies the subsidiarity principle as set forth in 
section 156(4) relates to the issue of judicial enforceability. The overview of 
comparative and international examples shows that judicial enforceability 
has certainly not been the defining feature of subsidiarity; its symbolic and 
political importance far outweighs its legal importance in the jurisdictions 
and instruments reviewed.
It is suggested that the same may apply to section 156(4) of the Constitution. 
A number of reasons may be advanced. Firstly, the fact that the rationale 
for subsidiarity lies in the realm of assessing effectiveness of governance 
renders the principle less open to judicial interpretation.65 The courts may 
be reluctant to be drawn into debates on the technical merits of locating a 
function at municipal level. This is as these are likely to centre on issues 
such as the efficiencies generated by municipal performance of the function, 
intergovernmental fiscal ramifications of the transfer, economic imperatives 
such as spill-over effects and intergovernmental efficacy, capacity 
assessments of municipalities etc. If more than seventeen years of experience 
with the European concept of subsidiarity is anything at all to go by, judicial 
enforcement of the principle seems unlikely to take hold. As Koopmans 
remarks with regard to the European concept:
“The concept of subsidiarity is concealed behind a screen of economic and legal technicalities. That 
may be the reason why the courts have not yet been invited to trace the limits of the concept.”66
Secondly, courts will, before hearing a dispute on the location of functions, 
insist on the exhaustion of intergovernmental remedies, as instructed by 
section 41(3) and (4) of the Constitution. Thirdly, section 156(4) requires 
assignment “by agreement”; the impact of this on judicial enforceability is 
unclear. It is common for a court to order parties to return to the negotiating 
table and work towards a settlement. However, it is not possible for a court to 
determine and impose upon the parties the content of an agreement. Judicial 
enforceability of section 156(4) suggests that, after a court order to assign, it is 
left up to the parties to formulate an agreement. Fourthly, whose obligation is 
it to assign Schedule 4A matters? Schedule 4 matters are concurrent national 
and provincial matters. Both national and provincial executives thus have 
the authority to assign a Schedule 4A matter to a municipality within their 
jurisdiction. Arguably, a municipal claim for assignment can be exercised 
against both, but which one of the two must be compelled to do so under 
the operation of section 156(4)? For example, can a provincial government, 
when confronted with a legal challenge on the basis of section 156(4), escape 
65 257
66 Koopmans “Subsidiarity, Politics and the Judiciary” 2005 European Constitutional Law Review 1 112, 
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liability by arguing that national government must assign, and vice versa? 
Fifthly, a calculated, programmatic approach to devolution that is managed 
through intergovernmental relations seems to fit in better with the emphasis 
on functionality in the South African principle of subsidiarity. It fits in better 
than a rights-based approach that delivers the full spectrum of decision 
making on the division of powers to the courts. In a rights-based approach, 
the spectre arises of, what can be termed, “slapstick asymmetry” whereby the 
invocation of section 156(4) of the Constitution by individual municipalities 
results in functions and powers tumbling up and down mitigated by a court 
with the unenviable task of mediating the endless intricacies of governance. 
This does not accord with the emphasis in the Constitution on cooperative 
government. Courts have on occasion resorted to the principle to ward off 
overly litigious organs of state.67 The Constitutional Court has made it clear, 
in the context of national-provincial relations, that cooperative government, 
rather than competitive federalism is the guiding principle.68 An unmitigated 
competition for competencies, refereed by the courts, does not accord with 
this trend in jurisprudence.
It was argued above that a functionality-based approach to subsidiarity is 
more amenable to taking into account external factors. It is suggested that one 
such external factor is particularly important. This concerns the indisputable 
reality of a grossly uneven distribution of skills among municipalities. This 
factor should play a role in the application of section 156(4) of the Constitution. 
Decentralisation inevitably results in competition for skills; indeed healthy 
competition is one of the virtues of decentralisation. However, it needs little 
argument that the distribution of skills among municipalities is inequitable to 
such an extraordinary degree that competition becomes a curse rather than a 
virtue. The unmitigated application of subsidiarity on a rights-based footing 
may result in these inequities being compounded rather than addressed. The 
capacity condition in section 156(4) does not suffice in mediating this risk. In 
an unmitigated, rights-based operation of section 156(4), the presence of an 
abundance of skill in a municipality may assist in attracting new functions to 
the municipality, especially since the capacity condition in section 156(4) is 
less problematic. These functions, in turn, attract funds and enhance the skills 
requirements of the municipality. The result of an “un-managed” application 
of section 156(4) may very well be a compounding of the inequitable 
distribution of skills. Again, a programmatic approach to devolution, mediated 
through intergovernmental relations would be better placed to confront these 
challenges.
67 See Uthekela District Municipality v President of the Republic of South Africa 2002 11 BCLR 1220 
(CC) 19  See also Ngqushwa Local Municipality v MEC for Housing, Local Government and Traditional 
Affairs 2005 JOL 14776 (Ck); National Gambling Board v Premier of KwaZulu-Natal and Others 2002 2 
BCLR 156 (CC) 41
68 In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 10 BCLR 1253 (CC) 
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11  The role of the subsidiarity principle
The justiciability of section 156(4) of the Constitution is thus not without 
problems. However, it is argued that the Constitution intends for the principle 
of subsidiarity to be recognised by government, Parliament and the courts as 
an important principle and value underlying the South African constitutional 
order. The general principle of subsidiarity should play a role in lawmaking, ie 
the drafting and adoption of laws, including amendments to the Constitution. 
Courts may also be guided by the principle of subsidiarity when they interpret 
existing competencies and when they are called upon to apply the rules on 
assignment of powers to local government.
11 1  Lawmaking
As contended earlier, the broader principle of subsidiarity has found its way 
into various provisions of the Constitution. It has thus already played a role, 
albeit a modest one, in the drafting of the Constitution. It is suggested that 
amendments to the Constitution should be made with recognition of the fact 
that the Constitution has established a governance system that acknowledges 
subsidiarity. This applies in particular to changes in the division of powers 
and functions among spheres of government.
In reality, both past and pending amendments to the Constitution that relate 
to the division of powers and functions among spheres seem to have little 
regard to the principle of subsidiarity. The most important amendment for 
local government thus far, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
Eleventh Amendment Act,69 significantly enlarged the scope for national 
or provincial intervention into the affairs of a municipality. A considerable 
component of a municipality’s autonomy, ie its budgetary power, may now 
be appropriated by the provincial government if that is necessary to avert 
certain defined financial emergencies.70 Recently proposed amendments to 
the Constitution71 will, if adopted, deviate even further from the concept 
of subsidiarity. The amendments seek to authorise national government to 
extensively regulate the exercise by municipalities of their constitutional 
authority over matters listed in Schedule 4B and 5B of the Constitution. In 
terms of the proposed amendment, national government will be empowered 
to do so “when it is necessary to achieve regional efficiencies and economies 
of scale in respect of a specific municipal function”.72 The precondition 
for such legislation is that “municipal boundaries and executive authority 
negatively impede regional efficiencies and economies of scale”.73 Once the 
above hurdles are cleared, the national legislation itself may be far-reaching 
69 Act 3 of 2003
70 S 139 of the Constitution  See De Visser Developmental Local Government – A Case Study of South Africa 
(2005) 194  It must be added that an earlier attempt at introducing, more draconian, intervention powers 
was rejected by Parliament with the argument that it was overly intrusive and lacked safeguards for 
local government  De Visser Developmental Local Government 193  For a discussion of the intervention 
powers, see further Steytler & De Visser Local Government Law 15-16 ff  
71 Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Bill
72 new s 156(1A)(a) as proposed in s 1 of the Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Bill
73 new s 156(1A)(d)(i) as proposed in s 1 of the Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Bill
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as it may provide for the re-arrangement of local government institutions and 
the compulsory transfer of municipal assets.74 The proposed amendments, if 
adopted, will pave the way for unprecedented levels of intrusion into municipal 
governance by national government. In fact, the amendments are aimed at 
removing from municipalities the authority to sell electricity as well as all 
the assets associated with that function.75 In addition to constricting local 
government policy making authority, the amendments restrain provincial 
governments who stand to lose their exclusive authority over Schedule 5B.76 
The conclusion must be that neither the protective nor the allocative aspect 
of the subsidiarity principle played any significant role in the minds of the 
drafters of these amendments.
With respect to national and provincial legislation, there are many examples 
of provisions that do not accord with the principle of subsidiarity. Some of these 
provisions may be remnants of the constitutional order predating the current 
Constitution that have not been brought in line with the new dispensation. 
Others may have been enacted after the 1996 Constitution came into effect, yet 
conflict with its subsidiarity principle. A comprehensive review of provisions 
that are inconsonant with subsidiarity falls outside of the scope of this article 
but a few examples are mentioned below.
The Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995 permits provincial development 
tribunals to consider and approve land development applications, establish 
townships and make amendments to town planning schemes, irrespective of 
a municipality’s role in managing land use.77 The Subdivision of Agricultural 
Land 70 of 1970 provides that the national Minister for agriculture approves 
each subdivision of agricultural land, again irrespective of a municipality’s role 
in managing land use within its municipal area.78 The recently enacted Local 
Government: Municipal Property Rates Act 6 of 2004 empowers the Minister 
for local government to instruct a municipality to limit a specific property 
rate if he or she deems the rate to be inconsistent with the Constitution.79 This 
provision violates the principle of protective subsidiarity in that it bypasses the 
constitutional safeguards for intervention into the affairs of a municipality.80 
There are also examples of provisions in provincial laws that conflict with the 
principle of subsidiarity. For example, section 26 of the KwaZulu-natal Road 
Traffic Act 7 of 1997 provides that in the event of a conflict between municipal 
and provincial law, the latter shall prevail in all instances. Such automatic 
submission of municipal law violates the principle of subsidiarity. Another 
example is the recently proposed Western Cape noise Control Regulations 
which, due the great level of detail, completely appropriate municipal policy 
making on the constitutional competency “noise pollution”.
74 new s 156(1A)(b)(i) as proposed in s 1 of the Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Bill
75 Para 2 of the Explanatory Memorandum, Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Bill
76 S 44(a)(ii) of the Constitution  
77 See in particular s 33 of the Act
78 S 3 of the Act
79 S 16(3)(a) of the Act
80 S 139 of the Constitution  
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There are positive examples as well. The recently enacted national Land 
Transport Act 5 of 2009 includes specific references to section 156(4) of the 
Constitution.81 The Act defines the responsibilities of national, provincial 
and local governments surrounding land transport and recognises that 
municipalities may invoke section 156(4) of the Constitution to be given 
additional functions.
11 2  Interpretation of competencies
The subsidiarity principle should play a role in the adjudication of 
disputes over competencies if they reach the courts. Van Wyk argues that 
the Constitution leaves room for “a competency bias in favour of the smaller 
sphere”, especially where there is uncertainty about the interpretation of the 
scope of competencies.82
Thus far, the Constitutional Court appears to have adopted an approach to 
the interpretation of competencies that is functional. For example, in DVB 
Behuising (Pty) Limited v North West Provincial Government the Court, when 
dealing with the division of powers and functions between the national and 
provincial legislatures, remarked that:
“[i]n the interpretation of those schedules there is no presumption in favour of either the national 
legislature or the provincial legislatures. The functional areas must be purposively interpreted in a 
manner which will enable the national parliament and the provincial legislatures to exercise their 
respective legislative powers fully and effectively”.83
This decision was handed down in the context of a dispute over provincial 
powers and makes it clear that there is little room for a presumption or an 
automatic bias in favour of the provincial sphere. Does the same apply to local 
government? Or does subsidiarity contain more added interpretative value 
with respect to local powers than it does with respect to provincial powers? It 
is suggested that it does. Subsidiarity has found more explicit recognition with 
respect to local government if it is compared with provincial government. The 
Constitution entrenches participatory subsidiarity with regard to provincial 
government (through the national Council of Provinces) but does not contain 
the same strongly worded expressions of protective and allocative subsidiarity 
with respect to provincial government. It is thus submitted that the principle 
of institutional subsidiarity and particularly its functional rationale, embedded 
in the developmental objects of local government should play a role in the 
interpretation of competencies by the courts. As it is the general principle of 
institutional subsidiarity that plays a role, it is not limited to Schedules 4 and 
5 but could extend to residual matters.
It is unfortunate, therefore, that the courts have not yet given much tangible 
recognition to the principle of subsidiarity when interpreting competencies. In 
Basson v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality and Eskom Pension 
and Provident Fund v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality84 and 
81 S 11(2)-11(4) of the Act
82 Van Wyk “Subsidariteit” in Suprema Lex 268
83 DVB Behuising (Pty) Ltd V North West Provincial Government 2000 4 BCLR 347 (CC) para 17
84 2005 JDR 1273 (T)
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City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development 
Tribunal,85 the abovementioned provisions of the Developmental Facilitation 
Act were challenged on the basis that they trespass on a municipality’s original 
authority on “municipal planning”. Instead of adopting a purposive approach 
to the interpretation of the municipal competency in accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity both courts adopted a literal interpretation that is 
difficult to follow and sanctioned the intrusion in town planning schemes by 
provincial tribunals.
The abovementioned right of the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries to approve subdivision of agricultural land was challenged in Wary 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd.86 The Constitutional Court considered 
whether the Schedule 4A competency “Agriculture” provided an adequate 
basis for this national power in the context of local government’s enhanced 
constitutional status. The majority of the Court interpreted “agriculture” to 
include direct control over individual municipal land use decisions pertaining 
to agricultural land. It based this interpretation on a purposive interpretation 
of national authority and responsibility with regard to agriculture and food 
production. The minority judgment, written by yacoob J held that the 
“Municipal planning” competency gives rise to municipal authority over 
land use planning. It found that national and provincial governments have 
adequate regulatory machinery at their disposal to protect agriculture and 
food production interests without requiring direct control of subdivisions of 
agricultural land. The dissenting judgment is to be preferred as it is consonant 
with the principle of subsidiarity. The Minister did not argue that less intrusive 
means to protect agriculture and food production interests were inadequate. 
The Minister simply sought to hold on to direct executive control. yacoob 
J, writing for the minority, captured the essence of how the principle of 
subsidiarity should have guided the adjudication of this conflict:
“The fear that agricultural land will disappear if the interpretation contended for in this judgment is 
accepted is wholly unjustified. The idea is based on the misplaced notion that the only way in which 
agriculture is to be developed and food made more readily available would be to preserve the power of 
the Minister to approve each and every sale and each and every subdivision of agricultural land.”87
11 3  Assignment of powers to local government
national and provincial governments have the authority to assign matters 
to local government in addition to the original powers local government 
already has on the basis of section 156(1) and Schedules 4B and 5B of the 
Constitution.
The Constitution contains a legal framework for the assignment of 
legislative and/or executive powers to local government. Sections 44(1)(a)(iii) 
and 104(1)(c) provide for the assignment of legislative powers by Parliament 
and provincial legislatures. Sections 99 and 126 provide for the assignment of 
executive powers by national and provincial cabinet members. An assignment 
85 2008 2 All SA 298 (W)
86 2008 11 BCLR 1123 (CC)
87 Para 139
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can be directed at local government or at (groups) of municipalities. Sections 
9, 10 and 10A of the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 provide for substantive 
and procedural criteria that must be followed when powers are assigned to 
local government.88 It is suggested that the principle of allocative subsidiarity 
as set forth in section 156(4) of the Constitution should play a role in the 
application of this framework. It is not a separate legal basis for assignment. It 
refers to the assignment, by agreement, of the administration of a Schedule 4A 
or 5A matter to a specific municipality. All of these ingredients point towards 
the assignments that have their basis in the abovementioned provisions of the 
Constitution that deal with assignment. It is therefore submitted that section 
156(4) is not an additional procedure or basis for assignment, but is rather a 
principle that sets out the circumstances under which assignment becomes 
compulsory.
As indicated earlier, the abovementioned national Land Transport Act, with 
its references to section 156(4) of the Constitution, recognises the importance 
of institutional subsidiarity. After setting out the national, provincial and 
municipal responsibilities surrounding land transport, the Act continues:
“(2)  The Minister may assign any function contemplated in subsection (1)(a) to a province or 
municipality, subject to sections 99 and 156(4) of the Constitution and sections 9 and 10 of the 
Systems Act, to achieve the objectives of the Constitution and this Act.
(3)  The MEC may assign any function contemplated in subsection 0)(b) to a municipality, subject 
to section 156(4) of the Constitution and sections 9 and 10 of the Systems Act to achieve the 
objectives of the Constitution and this Act.
(4)  Any municipality may request the Minister or MEC to assign a function contemplated in 
subsection (l)(a) or (b) to it, subject to sections 156(4) of the Constitution and sections 9 and 10 
of the Systems Act, where such municipality has an acceptable integrated transport plan.”89
The references to section 156(4) of the Constitution are not entirely 
clear though. The combination of the verb “may” and section 156(4) of the 
Constitution is potentially confusing. A reading of sections 11(2)-(4) that 
seeks to remove or even fudge the compulsory nature of the assignment in 
terms of section 156(4) would be unconstitutional as the text of section 156(4) 
is clear in this respect: assignment is compulsory when the criteria are met. 
A reading that makes the MEC or the Minister’s assigning power subject to 
the principle, set out in section 156(4) of the Constitution, is therefore the only 
correct interpretation, it is submitted. Subsection 4 adds little value. Firstly, 
without this provision, a municipality may also request an assignment as it is 
the Constitution itself that empowers it to do so. Secondly, if a municipality 
were to request assignment without having an acceptable transport plan, what 
would be the difference between asserting that it was never permitted to 
make the request and simply refusing the request? It would thus appear that 
the importance of the references to section 156(4) of the Constitution in the 
national Land Transport Act may be easily overstated.
88 The legal framework is augmented by a set of guidelines, promulgated by the Minister of Provincial and 
Local Government  See Guidelines on Allocation of Additional Powers and Functions to Municipalities, 
notice no 490, Government Gazette 29844, 26 April 2007
89 S 11(2)-11(4) of the Act (emphasis added)
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The recognition of section 156(4) of the Constitution, however inadequate, 
does bring to the fore the question of justiciability. Can section 156(4) be 
invoked before a court in order to compel a provincial or national executive to 
assign a Schedule 4A or a Schedule 5A matter to a municipality? As pointed 
out above, there are fundamental and practical difficulties that render section 
156(4) difficult, yet not impossible, to enforce. Eminent among these is the 
conundrum regarding the required level of deference shown by the judiciary 
to decisions of the other branches of government.
It may be useful to have regard to the manner in which courts in other 
jurisdictions have dealt with this matter. Of the two jurisdictions, where the 
principle of subsidiarity plays an important role, namely the EU and Germany, 
Germany offers the clearest example of justiciability. However, there are 
important limits to the extent to which Germany offers useful guidance to 
South African courts with regard to section 156(4) of the Constitution. Firstly, 
the German jurisprudence surrounding section 72(2) of the German Basic 
Law deals with federal-state relationships while section 156(4) of the South 
African Constitution deals exclusively with local government. Secondly, the 
application of section 72(2) of the Basic Law ultimately results in a negative 
sanction, ie the invalidation of legislation. The application of section 156(4) of 
the Constitution ultimately results in a court order, positively instructing the 
executive to assign. Thirdly, as indicated above, the South African provision, 
compared to its German (and EU) equivalent works in the opposite direction. 
Rather than determining when powers “may go up”, it determines when 
powers “may go down”. Fourthly, the criteria, offered by the two provisions 
are different, although not wholly dissimilar. The German provision revolves 
around necessity, endangerment to economic and legal unity and equal living 
standards. These are criteria that are common to the constitutional treatment 
of federalism and they generally relate to the degree of difference between 
states that must be tolerated in a federation. The first two criteria in section 
156(4) fall in a similar category. The questions whether the matter “necessarily 
relates to local government” and “would be most administered locally” relate 
to similar questions about appropriate decentralisation. They visit the theme 
of the degree of difference to be tolerated in a decentralised state. However, 
the third criterion, namely whether the municipality “has the capacity to 
administer it”, is foreign to the consideration required under section 72(2) of 
the German Basic Law and the German jurisprudence offers no assistance 
here.
It is submitted, however, that a cautious regard to the German approach 
is apposite insofar as it relates the general approach to the conundrum of 
judicial deference to political matters. The German Federal Constitutional 
Court’s decision in the Geriatric Caregivers case90 offers a useful distinction 
that may be helpful in approaching the issue of justiciability of section 156(4) 
of the Constitution. The Court distinguished between, on the one hand, the 
legislature coming to conclusions as to whether the law complies with the 
90 Judgment of Oct  24, 2002, BVerfG, 2 BvF 1/01 (Geriatric Caregivers case), available at http://www
bverfg de/entscheidungen/2002/10/24 (accessed 23-03- 2010)
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requirements of article 72(2) and, on the other, with the legislature determining 
the facts underlying such an assessment. On the first issue, the Court may 
review and on the second issue, the courts should show deference.91
A similar distinction should be made between the two actions of a national 
or provincial executive that make up a decision surrounding assignment 
to a municipality. Firstly, the executive gathers facts. For example, what 
financial, human and other resources and capabilities are present within 
the municipality in order to administer the matter for which assignment is 
requested or considered? Secondly, it considers such facts in order to answer 
the question whether the criteria of 156(4) are met. Does the municipality 
have the capacity to administer the matter? It is suggested that the executive 
should be afforded leeway in deciding how it gathers the facts that support 
its decision. Here, the courts’ review should be limited to ensuring that 
those facts actually exist without second-guessing the method of gathering 
facts. However, in considering whether the existence of those facts bring the 
matter within the ambit of section 156(4) of the Constitution and thus render 
assignment compulsory, the executive’s decision should be fully reviewable 
by a court of law.
Another area where the principle of subsidiarity may be applied by the courts 
is the compliance with intergovernmental consultation around assignment and 
delegation. The procedural requirements for assignment referred to earlier are 
designed to ensure effective assignments and to avoid the transfer of functions 
without resources and capacity for local government to execute those functions. 
The courts may be called upon, after intergovernmental dispute settlement 
has failed, to judge whether the Constitution and the Municipal Systems Act 
have been adhered to in the transfer of functions to local government or to 
a municipality. In assessing such claims, courts may be influenced by the 
principle of subsidiarity, particularly the protective and participatory aspects 
contained therein.
12  Conclusion
This article attempted to clarify the role played by section 156(4) of 
the Constitution by tracing some of the origins and manifestations of the 
principle of subsidiarity, on which this provision is modelled. It was argued 
that, although modelled on it, section 156(4) is different from the classic 
manifestation of subsidiarity, which would have established a principled 
and automatic bias for local government that only gives way to a reasoned 
argument in favour of other spheres of government. Section 156(4) works the 
other way around. It establishes a preference and not an automatic bias for 
local government. This preference must be substantiated with an argument 
that the assignment of the power to local government is functional in that it 
enables such government to achieve its developmental objects. It was further 
argued that section 156(4) of the Constitution may not be easily enforced 
separately by the courts, in part because of the deference shown by the courts 
91 Taylor 2006 Int’l J Const L 118
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to political decisions surrounding the configuration of the state. However, the 
experience of judicial enforcement of the subsidiarity principle in Germany 
may offer some guidance in this respect. The principle of subsidiarity should 
play a guiding role in lawmaking and the interpretation of competencies by 
the courts. A brief review of legislation and court judgments surrounding, for 
example, local government’s role in land use management, indicate that the 
principle is not given nearly the recognition it deserves.
SUMMARY
This article attempted to clarify the role played by section 156(4) of the Constitution by tracing some 
of the origins and manifestations of the principle of subsidiarity, on which this provision is modelled. 
It was argued that, although modelled on it, section 156(4) is different from the classic manifestation 
of subsidiarity, which would have established a principled and automatic bias for local government 
that only gives way to a reasoned argument in favour of other spheres of government. Section 156(4) 
works the other way around. It establishes a preference and not an automatic bias for local government. 
This preference must be substantiated with an argument that the assignment of the power to local 
government is functional in that it enables such government to achieve its developmental objects. It 
was further argued that section 156(4) of the Constitution may not be easily enforced separately by 
the courts, in part because of the deference shown by the courts to political decisions surrounding 
the configuration of the state. However, the experience of judicial enforcement of the subsidiarity 
principle in Germany may offer some guidance in this respect. The principle of subsidiarity should 
play a guiding role in lawmaking and the interpretation of competencies by the courts. A brief review 
of legislation and court judgments surrounding, for example, local government’s role in land use 
management, indicates that the principle is not given nearly the recognition it deserves.
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